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Do international factors influence the passage of 
climate change legislation?  
 
 
Abstract 
The number of climate change laws in major economies has grown from less than 40 in 
1997 to almost 500 at the end of 2013. The passage of these laws is influenced by both 
domestic and international factors. This paper reviews the main international factors, 
drawing on a powerful new dataset of climate legislation in 66 national jurisdictions. We 
find that the propensity to legislate on climate change is heavily influenced by the 
passage of similar laws elsewhere, suggesting a strong and so far under-appreciated role 
for international policy diffusion. International treaties like the Kyoto Protocol work in 
two ways. The impact of the Kyoto Protocol itself is limited to countries with formal 
obligations under the treaty. In addition, the prestige of hosting an international climate 
summit is associated with a subsequent boost in legislation. Legislators seem to respond 
to the expectations of climate leadership that these events bestow on their host.  
 
Policy relevance: A global solution to climate change will ultimately have to be anchored 
in domestic legislation, which creates the legal basis for countries to take action. 
Countries are passing climate legislation in a growing number. This paper asks to what 
extent they are motivated to do so by international factors, such as existing treaty 
obligations. We find that the Kyoto Protocol has been a less important factor in 
explaining climate legislation outside Annex 1 than the passage of similar laws 
elsewhere. This suggests that international policy diffusion plays an important and so far 
under-appreciated role in global  climate policy, complementing formal treaty 
obligations. 
 
Keywords:  climate change legislation, international policy diffusion, political economy.  
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1. Introduction  
Increasing numbers of countries are passing climate change legislation.  Practically all 
major emitters of greenhouse gases have in place laws to control emissions, conserve 
energy or promote cleaner forms of energy production, while vulnerable countries are 
taking steps to prepare for the impacts of climate change (Nachmany et al., 2014). These 
laws do not add up to a global response that would limit climate change to less than 2
o
C 
of global mean warming, but they provide the context in which a new international treaty 
on climate change is negotiated.  
The emergence of climate legislation can be explained by a combination of domestic 
factors, such as the energy-economic context and the interests of domestic actors, and 
international factors, such as treaty obligations (Falkner 2013, Never and Betz 2014).  
Oates and Portney (2005), Congleton (1992) and Hahn (1990) analyse domestic 
environmental policy and emphasise the crucial role of political institutions and national 
interest groups (see also Never 2012).  But there is also an international dimension. 
Approaches to environmental policy diffuse across jurisdictions, as policy makers learn 
from each other and “good practice” spreads (Jordan et al 2000; Jordan and Huitema 
2014). The global public good nature of climate change adds a further international 
dimension in that climate action is subject to international coordination (Kroll and 
Shogren 2008, Barrett 2007).  
The objective of this paper is to identify key international factors that contribute to the 
emergence of climate change legislation. A parallel paper using the same data also looks 
at domestic factors (Fankhauser et al., 2014). We contrast the role of policy diffusion – an 
autonomous, bottom up process through which climate policy may spread – with the 
effect of formal treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, which offer a more directed approach to 
policy coordination. 
We find statistically that both factors have a positive influence on the emergence of 
climate change legislation. The effect of policy diffusion is direct and simple. The 
propensity to pass climate legislation increases with the number of climate laws passed 
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elsewhere. The effect of international treaties is more complex. International 
commitments increase legislative action, but only in countries where the obligations bind. 
Treaties also offer a further incentive: the prospect of global leadership. We find that 
assuming a global leadership role, by hosting an international summit, can unblock 
domestic obstacles and lead to more climate legislation   
We derive these results from  a powerful new dataset, which  we helped assemble over a 
series of climate legislation surveys (Townshend et al., 2013; Townshend et al., 2011). 
Our analysis is the first to use the extended 2014 version of the data. A distinct feature of 
the surveys is that they were conducted in close cooperation with legislators from the 
parliaments concerned (Nachmany et al., 2014).  
The data reveal legislative action on climate change since 1990 in 66 jurisdictions – 65 
nation states, plus the European Union as a block – which were chosen to cover almost 
90% of global greenhouse gas emissions.
1
 The surveys adopt a fairly broad interpretation 
of what constitutes climate change legislation, which includes “relevant laws or 
regulations of comparable status” (such as executive orders or five-year plans; Nachmany 
et al., 2014) on energy supply, energy demand, transport and land-use change as well as 
climate-specific measures like carbon pricing, adaptation, research and new institutions.  
There are important caveats about the dataset (Fankhauser et al., 2014): it focuses on 
action at the national level, that is, it excludes state, province or city-level activities. 
There is no analysis of the quality or merit of individual laws (for example, the number of 
exemptions granted to affected industries), the degree to which a law is implemented or 
enforced, nor the eventual effect it has had.  
A particular problem for our research question is that when laws are amended the 
database only records the latest version, thus omitting earlier activities. Legal provisions 
are often tightened over time (as for example Switzerland did with its CO2 Act in 2013), 
but there are also cases of reversal (such as the repeal of Canada’s Kyoto Implementation 
Act in 2012 and Australia’s Clean Energy Act in 2014). Neither event is recorded in the 
                                                 
1 
 The data are available on: http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/wp-
content/uploads/2014/02/Legislation_Dataset.pdf 
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data.
2
 Similarly, for the 9 EU member states in the sample the database excludes laws that 
merely implement EU regulations. Only those laws that go beyond EU requirements are 
included.  
Nevertheless, the data constitutes one of the richest sources of information about climate 
change legislation available to date (see Dubash et al., 2013 for a survey of available data 
sets).  The data include almost 500 climate-relevant laws that were on the statute books of 
the 66 jurisdictions, although our study is restricted to 419 laws passed in 63 countries 
before the end of 2012 (see section 4 for details). 
The availability of data for over 1,400 country-years (63 countries over 23 years, 1990-
2012) allows us to adopt a quantitative, statistical approach. Much of the literature on the 
transfer and diffusion of environmental policy is qualitative or based on smaller samples, 
with the European Union a frequent case study (e.g., Jordan et al., 2000, Jordan and 
Lenschow 2000). Never and Betz (2014) study climate policy performance in seven 
emerging markets, while Jordan and Huitema (2014) study policy innovation, as well as 
its subsequent diffusion.  
As in our analysis, the main focus of these papers tends to be on policy adoption, rather 
than the post-adoption dynamics of laws. “Policy” is sometimes unpacked into its 
constituent parts (e.g., objectives and instruments) to explore whether diffusion differs 
between these elements. The pertinent literature identifies a broad set of driving forces, 
which includes international factors (such as international norms, knowledge transfer and 
pressure to conform), domestic drivers (such as domestic actors, institutions, interests and 
capacities), as well as the characteristics of the policy at hand (Bernstein and Cashore 
2012; Busch et al., 2005; Kern et al., 2001).   
Small-N comparative studies offer detailed descriptions of the mechanisms and processes 
of policy-making. However it is useful to complement their insights with quantitative 
                                                 
2
 The case of countries with a general tendency to update laws (that is, generally high legislative activity) is 
captured statistically by the inclusion of a fixed effect (see Technical Annex). If updates are driven by the 
same factors as the original legislation our results might underestimate the power of these factors, but 
only slightly. Results would be biased if the tendency to update laws was completely uncorrelated with 
initial adoption, but this seems unlikely. 
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results from larger data sets. The econometric analysis of policy diffusion has a long 
tradition (Graham et al. 2012), often using event history or hazard models (e.g., Berry 
and Berry 1990, 1992). Krause (2011) studies the adoption of climate policies among US 
cities, while Matisoff and Edwards (2014) analyse the diffusion of clean energy policies 
across US states. Bernauer et al. (2010),  Fredriksson and Gaston (2000), Sauquet (2014) 
and von Stein (2008) use statistical methods to analyse the interplay of international and 
domestic factors that explain the ratification of environmental treaties.  
Our analysis is in this mould. It contributes to this body of work by providing new panel-
data evidence on the international factors that explain the global adoption of climate 
change legislation. Understanding the international drivers behind climate change 
legislation is also important from a practical perspective, as it might help to unlock 
further climate action. However, our interest is solely in the international dynamics of 
how climate laws come about. We do not assess their impact, nor indeed judge whether 
more laws are always desirable. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 offers a brief qualitative description of 
climate change legislation and trends. Section 3 introduces the theoretical framework. 
Section 4 describes the methodology and main results. Section 5 discusses narrower 
results focused on particular country contexts (viz. Annex 1 vs non-Annex 1 countries, 
left-wing vs right-wing administrations, strong vs weak democracies). Section 6 
concludes. The main paper is complemented by a technical annex with additional 
information about methods and data. 
2. The Emergence of Climate Legislation   
The basic science of climate change has been known for over a century. Yet, it became an 
issue of wider policy concern only in the 1990s, after the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change had issued its first assessment report and countries started to negotiate 
what would become the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).  
Few countries followed up their (soft) commitments under the 1992 UNFCCC with 
domestic legislation. The first law that explicitly features climate change in its title is 
Japan’s Law Concerning the Promotion of the Measures to Cope with Global Warming of 
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1998. There were many efforts to protect forests and conserve energy already at that time, 
but they were motivated by policy concerns other than climate change.  
Figure 1 shows the emergence of climate change laws in the 66 jurisdictions studied by 
Nachmany et al. (2014). There is a steady increase starting in the late 1990s. At the time 
of the Kyoto Protocol, in 1997 there were still fewer than 40 relevant laws. By the end of 
2013 this had grown to almost 500, following a burst of legislative activity in particular 
around 2009 and 2010. 
Figure 1. Climate change legislation over time 
 
Note:  Annex I and non-Annex I as defined in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change.  
Source: Nachmany et al.(2014) 
 
Townshend et al. (2013) observe a change in the nature of climate legislation after  
2009/10.  Most Annex 1 countries had by that date introduced fairly comprehensive 
climate laws and subsequent legislation was aimed primarily at the implementation of 
earlier commitments. For example, in the UK the Climate Change Act of 2008 was 
followed by the Energy Act of 2013, which adjusts electricity market arrangements in 
light of the previously agreed carbon targets. As Annex 1 legislation matured, the 
momentum shifted to Non-Annex 1 countries, where new laws are still being added to a 
relatively small stock.  
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While there are climate change laws addressing all aspects of the problem, the focus is on 
energy. Almost half of the laws in the database deal with energy supply issues (such as 
renewable energy), and nearly 40% are concerned at least in part with energy demand 
(mostly energy efficiency). In Germany, for example, climate policy is driven in no small 
part by the Renewable Energy Sources Act of 2008, which sets the basis for the 
“Energiewende”. 
In tropical forest countries, a new suite of legislation has emerged which recognises the 
importance of sustainable forest management to both mitigation and adaptation. In 2013 
Indonesia has been particularly active, issuing a Decree to create a new management 
agency for REDD+ (Decree 62/2013); a Presidential Instruction that created a 
moratorium on new logging concessions (Inpres 6/2013 following Inpres 10/2011); and 
also regulations on REDD+ demonstration activities (P68/Menhut-II/2008). 
In most countries there is also what Townshend et al. (2013) call a “flagship” law – a 
wide-ranging piece of legislation that fundamentally defines a country’s approach to 
climate change, often setting emissions targets or unifying earlier policies under one 
umbrella. Good examples are Mexico’s General Law on Climate Change, passed in 2012, 
and the French Grenelle laws of 2009 and 2010.  
3. Theoretical Framework 
Econometric techniques can shed further light on the dynamics of climate change 
legislation described qualitatively above. Our particular interest is in international factors 
that may have driven the adoption of climate change legislation. In particular, we are 
interested in two different, but complementary processes.  
On the one hand we are interested in policy diffusion as a decentralised, bottom-up 
process through which climate policy spreads across jurisdictions. On the other hand, 
there are formal international treaties like the Kyoto Protocol, which offer a more 
directed, centralised approach to policy coordination. We also seek to unpack the 
channels through which an international treaty may influence domestic legislation. The 
most obvious way is through binding commitments, but there may be other incentives. In 
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particular, Townshend et al. (2011) speculate that the prospect of global leadership under 
a treaty can change the domestic debate about climate legislation. This gives rise to the 
following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1.  Policy diffusion through learning and other spill-over effects matters and 
dominates the incentive of countries to free ride. That is, domestic climate legislation is 
positively correlated with the number of laws already adopted by other countries. 
 
International policy diffusion takes place “when government policy decisions in a given 
country are systematically conditioned by prior policy choices made in other countries” 
(Simmons et al. 2006). In the context of climate policy, econometric studies of diffusion 
include Bernauer et al. (2010) and Sauquet (2014), who analyses countries’ ratification 
behaviour of environmental treaties. Sauquet (2014) identifies two counteracting effects. 
On the one hand, action taken by other countries can encourage free-riding. If the 
problem is addressed by others, countries may feel less of a need to act themselves. On 
the other hand, policy experience is known to diffuse across countries through knowledge 
spill-overs, learning effects and peer pressure (Bernstein and Cashore 2012; Busch et al., 
2005; Kern et al., 2001). If policy diffusion occurs, the climate action a country 
undertakes is likely to depend on prior climate legislation by other countries. We 
therefore test the power of policy diffusion by regressing climate legislation against the 
number of laws passed in all other countries in the sample. 
 
Hypothesis 2. Binding obligations under an international treaty are likely to boost the 
passage of climate change laws. That is, we expect to see an increase in climate 
legislation after the Kyoto Protocol was signed, at least in Annex 1 countries. 
 
International treaties like the Kyoto Protocol impose commitments that may need to be 
implemented through new domestic legislation. Although the sanctions for non-
compliance tend to be soft (Barrett 2007), countries face reputational risks if they renege 
on their international pledges. We test this hypothesis on the Kyoto Protocol and explore 
whether the passage of climate laws increased in the years after the treaty was signed.  
We consider the year of signature, rather than ratification, to avoid a potential 
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endogeneity bias
3
. We do not consider participation in the UNFCCC, since every country 
in the sample signed it in 1992 so there is not much variation in the data.  
 
Hypothesis 3. The leadership expectations associated with hosting a climate summit can 
change the domestic debate in favour of climate legislation. That is, we expect climate 
legislation to increase after a country hosts the annual Conference of the Parties (COP). 
 
Governments willing to pass climate change legislation will face opposition from vested 
interests. The influence of veto players on environmental policy making is a standard 
feature of political economy models (e.g. Fredriksson et al., 2007; von Stein 2008). 
Hosting a high-profile international meeting thrusts the host nation into a position of 
international leadership. It has been argued that this may overcome internal resistance and 
motivate subsequent climate legislation (Townshend et al., 2011). Lockwood (2013) 
observes for example how the prominence given to climate change at the G8 Summit in 
Gleneagles in 2005 contributed to a “groundswell of public interest and concern” in the UK 
that led to the 2008 Climate Change Act. We test the hypothesis by focusing on a different, 
more regular kind of summit, the annual conference of the parties to the UNFCCC.  
 
4. Methodology and Main Results 
The 2014 version of the climate legislation survey (Nachmany et al., 2014) covers 
legislation activity in 66 jurisdictions between 1990 and 2013. However, we had to 
exclude three jurisdictions (the EU, Micronesia and the Maldives) as well as laws passed 
in 2013, as data were not available for all the variables of interest. 
Using the remaining up to 1,449 data points (63 countries times 23 years, 1990-2012), we 
test our hypotheses by estimating different versions of the following equation: 
           yit =a+bIit +gXit +qi +nt +eit  (1) 
                                                 
3
 The literature on the drivers of Kyoto ratification (Neumayer, 2002; Fredriksson et al. 2007; Von Stein, 
2008; Sauquet, 2014) finds that ratification behavior is correlated with domestic legislation activity. 
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In the main specification yit  represents the total number of climate laws adopted in 
country i at year t, although we also run regressions for particular types of laws (e.g. 
energy supply laws). The vector Iit indicates the international factors of interest, while 
vector Xit contains domestic control variables, such as the level of democracy and GDP 
per capita (see Technical Annex). We also include a full set of country and year fixed 
effects (which pick up country-specific features and evolving global factors such as an 
increased scientific consensus) and a random error term.  The international variables of 
interest are:  
 Diffusion: number of climate laws (of each type) adopted by all other countries 
until time t-1.  
 Kyoto: lagged dummy for the 4 years after the Kyoto Protocol (1998-2001).  
 Host: hosting a COP, dummy for the year of the meeting and subsequent two 
years. 
We estimate equation (1) using a negative binomial fixed effects model where the log of 
the expected count is a function of the predictor variables. The count model is suitable 
since we are dealing with a count dependent variable characterized by over-dispersion 
(i.e. the mean is lower than the variance) and events (e.g. law adoptions) that a country 
can experience more than once (Allison and Waterman 2002; Cameron and Trivedi 1998, 
2010). These features prevent the use of hazard models, which have been employed to 
study policy adoption elsewhere (e.g., Berry and Berry 1990, 1992). The negative 
binomial is also best suited to deal with the large number of zero entries (i.e. country-
years without legislative action), which represent about 80 per cent of all observations.  
Table 1 reports the results based on the full sample of ca. 1,400 country-years. For the 
main results (column 1) the dependent variable is the total number of climate laws. 
Columns (2) to (8) display the same calculations for specific types of legislation. That is, 
they only count laws dealing with energy supply, energy demand, new climate 
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institutions, adaptation, transportation, low-carbon research and development  or 
deforestation (REDD).
4
 
We find strong evidence of policy diffusion. Countries are encouraged to pass climate 
legislation by the legislative activities of other countries.  Diffusion clearly  dominates 
any temptation to free-ride. Consistent with hypothesis 1, the stock of laws adopted 
previously by all other nations is a very powerful predictor of additional legislative 
activity. 
In contrast, the observed impact of the Kyoto Protocol is unexpected. The post-Kyoto 
period of 1998 to 2001 was characterized by lower legislative activity than normal across 
the full sample of countries. This counter-intuitive result is inconsistent with hypothesis 2 
and will require further exploration. As we will see below, it could be due to the fact that 
Kyoto imposed commitments only on a small number of countries or because the Kyoto 
effect takes longer to materialise.  
Table 1. Analysis of the Number of Laws Passed (years: 1990-2010). Model: Negative Binomial 
Fixed Effects. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES All_laws Energy_Supply Energy_Demand Institutions Adaptatio
n 
Transportation R&D REDD 
         
         
Diffusion 0.159*** 0.578*** 0.518*** 0.582*** 2.804*** 1.680*** 1.463*** 1.148** 
 (0.061) (0.136) (0.182) (0.126) (0.550) (0.282) (0.343) (0.483) 
Host 0.680*** 0.301 0.841** 0.433 1.270 1.533** 1.238* 1.803*** 
 (0.237) (0.236) (0.420) (0.324) (1.087) (0.595) (0.689) (0.550) 
Kyoto -5.601* -7.301*** 8.433*** -3.656 0.054 -12.393*** -12.598*** -2.469 
 (3.250) (2.416) (2.988) (4.050) (3.239) (3.351) (2.918) (7.624) 
         
Other controls YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES  YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 1,383 
 Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Consistent with hypothesis 3, the international negotiations appear to have a galvanising 
effect on the countries that host the annual conference of the parties. While this 
establishes correlation, we cannot completely preclude a reverse causality. The UNFCCC 
                                                 
4
 Note that many laws address more than one issue and therefore feature in several of the narrower 
specifications. For example, renewable energy, energy efficiency and carbon pricing may all be addressed 
in the same law. 
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might prefer host countries with legislation in the pipeline and/or countries might 
volunteer to host a COP to showcase their domestic achievements.  To test this 
alternative, we ran the model with an additional dummy for the two years before a COP. 
We do not find a significant effect for the new variable, which lends support to the 
original hypothesis. The hypothesis is supported by anecdotal evidence. Officials from 
host countries often emphasise how hosting the COP changed political dynamics and 
facilitated the passage of legislation (Townshend et al., 2013; Nachmany et al., 2014). 
Japan and Mexico are prominent countries which passed major climate change laws 
within a few years of hosting a COP.   
The results for specific types of climate legislation (columns 2-8) are broadly similar. 
Policy diffusion and hosting a COP are strongly associated with additional climate 
legislation in all regressions. However, a note of caution is required in interpreting the 
results in columns (2)-(8): given the smaller number of non-zero observations when 
considering specific types of law, the evidence becomes less robust that the analysis of all 
climate laws in column (1).  
5. Evidence Related to Particular Country Contexts 
We then repeat the same analysis for a series of restricted data sets. This can shed light on 
legislative dynamics in particular political contexts or for particular groups of countries. 
Table 2 reports on six such regressions. In smaller datasets the number of zero 
observations (that is country-years without legal activity) becomes more pertinent 
statistically.  To maintain a sufficient number of non-zero observations, the restricted 
sample estimations are carried out only for the total number of climate laws.  
In the first set of regressions (columns 1 and 2) we explore whether different dynamics 
are at play depending on the political orientation of the government (which in turn is a 
reflection of voter preferences, Lee et al. 2004). To do so, we split the sample into periods 
of left-wing and right-wing administrations. Left-wing governments are less frequent; 
that sample is considerably smaller, and the results correspondingly weaker. 
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Table 2. Analysis of the Number of Laws Passed (years: 1990-2010). Model: Negative Binomial 
Fixed Effects 
 Political orientation of 
 the executive 
Status under  
the UNFCCC 
Quality of democracy 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Left-wing Right-wing Annex 1 Non-Annex 1 High Low 
       
Diffusion 0.185*** 0.180** 0.190*** 0.142 0.115*** 0.812*** 
 (0.047) (0.082) (0.059) (0.093) (0.043) (0.190) 
Host 0.124 0.642* 0.815* 0.590* 0.597** 0.150 
 (0.636) (0.349) (0.444) (0.308) (0.251) (0.755) 
Kyoto 5.032* -7.254* 4.673 -5.137 9.540*** -38.369*** 
 (2.591) (4.194) (3.237) (4.733) (2.219) (9.637) 
       
Other controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Country FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year FE YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Obs. 471 912 418 967 762 645 
                Clustered standard errors at the country level in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
(a) We were unable to account for the business cycle and the level of GDP, as the negative binomial model failed to converge 
when including these variables. 
 
There is evidence that left-wing governments are more inclined to pass environmental 
legislation (Neumayer 2003), although the link between party politics and environmental 
policy can be complex (Folke 2014). Table 2 suggests that there are also differences in 
the way right-wing and left-wing governments are influenced by international factors. 
Policy diffusion is strong under both types of government. However, each responds 
differently to international treaties. Under right-wing governments the galvanising effect 
of hosting an international summit is much stronger, while left-wing governments are 
more likely to follow up on international commitments. Left-wing governments were 
more inclined to pass climate legislation in the aftermath of Kyoto, while the opposite 
happened under right-wing governments.   
Columns 3 and 4 report separate results for Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries. The 
results on policy diffusion and hosting a COP are broadly consistent with the main 
findings, although policy diffusion in non-Annex 1 countries is no longer statistically 
significant. We assign this to the diverse nature of the non-Annex 1 grouping. This makes 
it more difficult to capture diffusion effects, which are strongest among countries with 
similar histories and backgrounds. 
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Perhaps of more interest is the difference in sign for the Kyoto dummy. For Annex I 
countries the coefficient is positive (although not statistically significant, probably due to 
the small number of observations), while it is negative outside Annex 1. This suggests 
that the low level of climate legislation following Kyoto that we observed in the full 
sample (Table 1) is due to the trend in non-Annex I countries, which represent 70 per cent 
of our sample. For Annex 1 countries, which have binding obligations under Kyoto, the 
Protocol has led to the expected increase in legislative activity. 
To further test this hypothesis we perform a t-test to compare the average number of laws 
passed in different time periods (Table 3) . We find statistically higher legislation activity 
in Annex I countries after 2001, that is, a few years after the protocol was signed in 
December 1997 and the ratification wave began. The difference persists until 2009, a year 
after the Kyoto compliance period began. After that point the effect levels off, perhaps 
because climate action is increasingly expected from all countries. 
Table 3. T-test of the difference in legislation activity between Annex I and Non-Annex I 
countries in different time periods (average laws per country and year).  
 Number of Laws Passed 
Non-Annex I 
Number of Laws Passed 
Annex I 
Mean Difference P-value 
Period: 1990-1993 
 
0.039 0.039 0 0.991 
Period: 1994-1997 
 
0.096 0.065 0.030 0.487 
Period: 1998-2001 
 
0.119 0.197 -0.078 0.138 
Period: 2002-2005 
 
0.238 0.434 -0.195 0.020 
Period: 2006-2009 
 
0.5 0.868 -0.368 0.005 
Period: 2010-2012 
 
0.681 0.561 0.120 0.401 
 
The last two regressions (columns 5 and 6) split the sample into countries with more or 
less advanced democracies (where the latter are defined as having a Polity2 score of less 
than 8, Fankhauser et al., 2014). The two sub-samples are more balanced than for the 
other split regressions, with a similar number of observations in each. The most striking 
result is the significant increase in climate legislation after Kyoto among advanced 
democracies. The opposite holds for less democratic regimes. The former grouping 
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includes the majority of Annex 1 countries, but it is also possible that advanced 
democracies are more concerned about reputation effects. This is consistent with 
Neumayer (2002), who found that democracies exhibit a stronger international 
environmental commitment.  
The host country effect is positive only for advanced democracies, but since 17 out of 19 
COP meetings until 2013 have taken place in advanced democracies, the absence of an 
effect in weaker democracies is not surprising. As before, we find evidence of a diffusion 
effect in both sub-samples. 
6.  Conclusions 
Despite slow progress in the international negotiations, governments around the world 
have started to legislate on climate change. They enact provisions not just to prepare for 
the impacts of a changing climate (where there are clear domestic incentives to act) but 
also to reduce greenhouse gas emissions (where there might have been temptation to 
await a new global treaty). A key concern of legislators is the cleaner production and 
more efficient use of energy, but climate laws also cover transport, agriculture, forestry 
and a host of other activities.  
Many laws are couched in terms of domestic objectives like green growth, energy 
security or air pollution, rather than climate change per se. For example, South Korea’s 
main climate law is the 2009 Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth. In the US, 
the main legislative (as opposed to regulatory) response at the federal level is the 2009 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, which promoted low-carbon investment as a 
way to stimulate an ailing economy. Yet countries like Germany, France, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Switzerland and the UK have all passed laws that are explicitly aimed at climate 
change, establishing new policies, processes and institutions (such as independent 
agencies and oversight bodies) to deal with the problem.  
This paper analyses the international driving forces behind the adoption of such 
legislation, using a powerful data set of climate legislation since 1990.  The paper is not 
interested in the detailed workings or the technical content of these laws, although this is 
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clearly an important area of research and policy practice. Our interest is how international 
drivers may have contributed to the passage of the laws. We contrast the autonomous 
process of policy diffusion across countries with the more formal incentives provided by 
international treaties.  
The debate so far, both practical and theoretical, has focused heavily on the importance of 
international treaties. We find some evidence of a commitment effect arising from the 
Kyoto Protocol, but only in countries with binding treaty obligations. . Legislative 
activity in Annex 1 countries has been significantly higher than in non-Annex 1 countries 
in the years following Kyoto, but there is no evidence that the Kyoto Protocol has 
increased overall legislative activities across all countries. This points to the need for a 
more comprehensive treaty that binds in all major emitters.  
International treaties also have another effect. Hosting a climate summit – which 
catapults the host into a position of environmental leadership – is associated with 
additional domestic legislation in subsequent years. It appears that international media 
presence and pressure to lead by example can change the domestic discourse and push 
climate change up the political agenda. The effect is very strong statistically, and as such 
important, but it is of less significance in terms of the global number of laws, given the 
relatively small number of countries that have hosted a summit.  
In contrast, we find clear evidence of the power of international policy diffusion. The 
propensity to legislate is heavily influenced by the passage of climate change laws 
elsewhere. The effect is significant and positive for all types of climate legislation and in 
all the country groupings we analyse. This diffusion mechanism, which is at work outside 
the formal architecture of the UNFCCC, has perhaps been under-appreciated so far, 
although the debate is increasingly about more diverse forms of global governance 
(Stavins and Ji, 2014).  
More work is needed to unpack and understand this diffusion effect. For example, our 
analysis does not tell us whether the process works through peer pressure or 
intergovernmental learning, although the literature is beginning to shed light on this 
question (e.g., Jordan and Huitema, 2014). It would also be fruitful to differentiate further 
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between different peer groups and address questions of country interdependency 
(sometimes referred to as Galton’s problem, Braun and Gilardi, 2006). We measure the 
diffusion effect by the number of laws passed in all other countries, but it is reasonable to 
assume that it will differ depending on the cultural and economic ties between countries. 
This may be worth exploring further (see also Sauquet, 2014). 
It is worth recalling that we do not assess the quality of laws or progress in their 
implementation.  Our approach is purely enumerative, based on the number of laws that 
have been passed, and of course more laws do not necessarily equate to stronger climate 
policy. Individual laws will differ in their ambition (e.g. their carbon targets), stringency 
(e.g. the number of exemptions) and scope (e.g. sector coverage) as well as in and the 
degree to which they are implemented.. The number of laws also depends on legislative 
strategy, in terms of what is deemed to require primary legislation and what is left to 
policies and regulation. For example, Indonesia has no fewer than 27 climate laws, while 
China’s climate provisions are concentrated in a few powerful legal acts, including the 
12
th
 Five-year Plan of 2011. 
Nevertheless, we believe our results put the spotlight on an important set of international 
drivers that is wider than just the commitment effect of global treaties. While a new 
climate treaty is essential, our results caution against focusing exclusively on formal 
international commitments as the sole solution to the climate problem. Climate change is 
a global collective action problem that requires international coordination. However, it 
appears that legislative action at the country level could be equally important in creating 
momentum through the international diffusion of policy, and that this might be a possible 
route to unlock the stalemate in the international negotiations. 
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Technical Annex 
 
We use a negative binomial fixed effects model to estimate different versions of the 
following equation:  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝐈𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝐗𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 + 𝜈𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡         (1) 
Where yit represents the number of climate laws adopted in country i at year t.  The 
vector Iit indicates the international factors of interest (discussed in the main text), while 
vector Xit contains control variables.  We also include a full set of country and year fixed 
effects (and a random error term).  The vector of controls includes the following 
economic and political economy variables (see Fankhauser et al., 2014 for further detail): 
 The presence of a flagship law, which sets the basis of subsequent legislative 
activity. 
 GDP per capita as an indicator of the socio-economic context, taken from the 
IMF's statistics database. 
 The cyclical component of GDP as a measure of the business cycle, computed 
through a Hodrick-Prescott filter (Doda 2014). 
 Political institutions variables from Beck et al. (2001, updated in 2012), including 
dummies for presidential systems, for the political orientation of the executive and 
for the electoral cycle (year of election and year before an election). 
 Democracy variables from the Polity IV dataset, including the strength of 
democracy (using the polity2 index) and constraints on the executive (i.e. whether 
the party of the executive has an absolute majority in the legislative).  
As a robustness check we also estimate the model using logit fixed effects, which 
measures the (binary) probability of passing at least one law in a particular country and 
year. That is, rather than counting the number of laws passed each year, the dependent 
variable is binary, taking a value of 1 if at least one law was passed in a country-year and 
0 otherwise. The results are broadly consistent and therefore not reported here. 
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Another alternative specification concerns the use of fixed effects. The main model 
includes separate country and year fixed effects. One might be concerned that under this 
structure the policy diffusion variable could capture no more than a general increase in 
adoption (or in any unobservable correlated with adoption). To explore this issue we 
experiment with an alternative to equation (1), which also includes a country-specific 
linear time trend. The additional variable accounts for any unobservable changes over 
time at the country level. The drawback of this model is that it is less likely to converge 
for runs that are limited to particular kinds of laws (i.e. those related to energy, 
transportation, adaptation, etc.). However, for the total number of laws it delivers results 
very similar to the ones obtained from the main specification.  
 
